“The learned judge erred in finding the facts of Patrick Makumbi Vs. Sole Electric Ltd relevant.” Mr. Byenkya made some four destinations between the Makumbi’s case and the decision of this Court in the appeal by the applicants in this Court. It is accepted that the appeal in Makumbi’s case was interlocutory and that the hearing of the appeal itself was brief. But that is substantially what the difference between the two cases. The other differences are artificial. For it is difficult to interpret the decision of the Court in the present case as conferring title rather than as making a definitive pronouncement on a point of law. In that sense the decision of the appeal in this case cannot be on all fours with the decision in Uganda Blanket’s case because in the latter case there was a definite decision on proprietary interests and those interests were quantified provided a basis for the taxation of instruction fee. We are therefore of the opinion that there are more similarities between the decision in Makumbi’s case and the present case than there are between Blanket Manufacturers case and the present case. Ground (e) must therefore fail. The last ground (f) states that:“The award of the learned judge was in all the circumstances of the case manifestly inadequate.” Mr. Byenkya submitted that the appeal in this case was among the most important appeals last year and a locus classicus in that it affected an entire Asian Community as owners of most town estates; that property in the suit is substantial; that the case overturned Lutaya vs. Gandesha (1986) HCB 46 and that this case justified a higher award of instruction fee. Mr. Ssekandi countered in effect that the learned judge considered all relevant facts and principles before he reduced the award of the instruction fee; that it is irrelevant whether other people are taking advantage of the decision of the Court in this case. In our view the learned judge considered all the relevant facts to this case and applied the relevant principles in his ruling. The decision of the appeal in this case is certainly of public importance but that is only one aspect of the matter to be considered in awarding instruction fee. In terms of paragraph 9(2) of the third schedule to the rules-