10 would remain intact as stipulated by section 10 (3) of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act. The second argument about a co-author is absurd because one Jocelyn Keko participated in the production. Her participation does not mean that there was no copyright infringement as far as the Plaintiff is concerned. Under section 11 of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act, coauthors would still have equal rights. Where one of them chooses to enforce her rights while another is happy to sit back it cannot take away the rights of the former. However this is not the case of co-authors because PW1 explained at the opening of cross-examination that she was the sole owner of the song. That there is another at least two features in the song. She paid her. Counsel emphasised that in the production of a song, film, literary work, art piece etc it is not necessary to restrict the efforts to one individual. There will always be helpers to handle specific tasks such as drummers, backup, drivers, stage managers, sound effects men etc. They are paid for their work. Consequently reference to section 35 of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act is irrelevant because Jocelyn Keko is not a co-author. The argument that other claimants might emerge if the Defendant is liable is not tenable. On the basis of the above the first issue ought to be resolved in favour of the Plaintiff. Whether the Defendant's actions fell within the fair use exception? The Plaintiff's Counsel concedes that if the court finds that the Defendant made a fair use of the Plaintiffs work, it is excused. He went on to define what "fair use" means. Counsel considered a printout exhibited by the Defendant exhibit D5 which is claimed to be a YouTube fair use policy. He attacked the printout on the ground that it does not claim to be a policy statement. It is a piece of advice to YouTube users advising them on what courts particularly in the USA use as a guide in determining whether or not fair use has been made of the work in question. Most importantly the print out actually cautions persons who make use of YouTube materials to ensure that they do not fall foul of the laws of his or her country. "Factor" number three of the four factors of fair use set out in the printout reiterates the above submission that the use of a small portion which constitutes the "heart" of the work may fall outside the ambit of fair use. The Defendant did not clearly make proper use of the advice from YouTube. Section 15 (1) of the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act lists 11 situations are considered to be fair use. Counsel submitted that the Defendants use did not fall within the 11 situations spelt out under the provision. Namely the adaptation of the Plaintiff song into an advertisement was not "for private use only" but was released to the public by mass media on at least two radio stations for five days as admitted by DW1. Secondly section 15 (1) (b) and (c) not assist the Defendants used because it did not acknowledge the Plaintiff as author in the advertisements or at all. Section 15 (1) (d) does not assist either because it only protects use in educational institutions and also requires acknowledgement of the source. In a like manner subsection (e)