chamber summons is signed by counsel for the applicant and issued by court. The chamber
summons states that the grounds of application are set out in the affidavit of Ms Esther Kilonzi
which is attached. The said affidavit does not contradict ground (a) of the chamber summons.
The bone of contention raised by the respondents counsel is contained in a supplementary
affidavit filed on court record about 38 days after the chamber summons was issued by court.
The chamber summons was issued on the 19th of May 2011 and the supplementary affidavit of
Charles Njenga filed on court record on the 27th of June 2011. Paragraph 2 of the said affidavit
avers that the applicant has been trading in the said produces “Nice & Lovely” since 2001 and
has acquired a substantial reputation thereof. The affidavits of Charles Njenga and Esther Kilonzi
are not contradictory on the question of dates when the applicant commenced business. Counsel
for the respondent in his address conceded that the affidavit of Esther Kilonzo does not indicate
when the applicant commenced business. As far as the application is concerned there is no
contradiction with the affidavit in support. For the above reasons the case of Bitaitana vs.
Kanamira (supra) is distinguishable. If there is an error in the pleading concerning the dates, it
is an error of the drafting counsel. Accordingly the second ground of objection to the application
also fails and is overruled.
Going to the merits of the application, the applicant‟s application was lodged under order 41
rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Under order 41 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, the applicant has to prove by affidavit or
otherwise that:
“(a) any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated
by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or
(b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his or her property
with a view to defraud his or her creditors.”
It is an essential requirement of order 41 rules 1 to be invoked that the matter in dispute should
be “property”. Secondly the property should be the subject matter of the dispute in the suit.
Thirdly the applicant has to prove that the property which is in dispute is in danger or being
wasted, damaged or alienated by a party to the suit. The court is then moved to save the property.
Alternatively, if the property is not in dispute, the defendant must have threatened or intended to
remove it or alienate it in any way with a view to defraud his or her creditors. The term property
under order 41 rules 1 in the applicant‟s case has to be addressed. Is it the proprietary right
assigned to the applicant conferred by the registered trademark? Can be asserted that such
proprietary right to a trademark is in danger of been wasted or alienated? Will the rule include
the products under the disputed trade dress? Would this be the property in dispute in the rule?
Does this rule cover the applicant‟s application? It can be maintained that what is in dispute is
the proprietary interest in the trademark which is in danger of been wasted? I will for the purpose
of this application find that order 41 rule 1 is applicable if properly applied.