Judicial precedents in criminal appeals are that where a conviction is supported by the clearest
evidence the appellate court would not quash the conviction on grounds of irregularity in
pleadings or defect in the charge or other matters. In the case of King versus Thompson [1914]
2 KB 99 the accused had been charged with incest and convicted. On appeal it was held than the
indictment was bad in that more than one offence was charged in each count. Isaacs CJ held that
they dismissed the appeal on the ground that:
―even if assuming that the objection raised after plea to the defect in the form of
indictment was not taken too late and that the Appellant could have moved in arrest of
judgment, no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred, and that we were, therefore,
bound to give effect to the proviso in section 4 subsection 1 of the Criminal Appeal Act
1907, which provides as follows:
"provided the court may, notwithstanding that there are of the opinion that the
point raised in the Appeal might be decided in favour of the Appellant, dismiss
the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually
occurred.‖
If we had thought that any embarrassment or prejudice had been caused to the Appellant
by the presentment of the indictment in this form we should have felt bound to quash the
convictions whatever our views might be as to the merits of the case. It must not be
thought that we are deciding that such objections should not be allowed to prevail either
at the trial or in this court. An indictment so framed might undoubtedly hamper the
defence, and if it did we should give effect to the objection. There are also other
objections to an indictment which must be held good at any time, as, for example, an
objection on the ground of want of jurisdiction.
One of the objects of section 4 was to prevent the quashing of a conviction upon a mere
technicality which had caused no embarrassment or prejudice. Whilst giving the right of
appeal upon any wrong decision of any question of law, the object of the legislature was
that justice should be done in spite of the wrong decision and that the court should not
interfere if it came to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the wrong decision, there had
been no substantial miscarriage of justice. The court must always proceed with a caution