under the Copyright Act 1842 which had no originality requirement. The Copyright Act 1911
changed that with the introduction of the originality requirement which is now manifested in the
Ugandan Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act, 2006. In that case Lord Halsbury premised his
decision on the criticism of the Court of Appeal insistence on an original composition as if that
was a statutory requirement. In the case of Exxon Corporation versus Exxon Insurance
Consultants Insurance Ltd (1982) Graham J observed that prior to the 1911 Act, copyright
protection was limited to books and there was no express originality requirement. He concluded
that the cases before 1911 must be read with those qualifications in mind. Furthermore Lord
Roseberry had not sought copyright protection owing in part to his lack of interest as he had not
registered his copyright under the requirements of the law and was not even a party to the
ensuring litigation though it was evident that the primary copyright in the speeches vested in
him.
Whether or not the Defendant/third-party infringed the Plaintiff’s rights?
On this issue the Plaintiff's Counsel submitted that it is for the Defendant or the third-party to set
up and prove their defences. He submitted that the evidence shows that no lawful defence has
been proved against the Plaintiffs claim. He submitted that the defences against copyright
infringement are statutory. On the other hand the defences raised by the Defendant and the thirdparty are that the works are derivatives and that the Plaintiff's speeches were already in the public
domain under the ringtones were fair use of the current information of political speeches.
Counsel contended that this was a fishing expedition of a defence.
He submitted that the Plaintiff discerned the attempt at a defence of derivatives from the
evidence to the effect that the third-party undertook certain transformational steps on the
speeches to produce the ringtones. The Plaintiff's Counsel reiterated submissions that the
Plaintiff is the author of the works. Under section 9 (f) of the Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights Act, the Plaintiff as the author had the exclusive right to authorise other persons such as
the Defendant or the third-party to make a derivative work, if any. However the evidence of the
witnesses is that this consent was never obtained or received from the Plaintiff and therefore the
defence is unavailable to the Defendant/third-party. The Plaintiff's Counsel further submitted that
the ringtones do not constitute derivative works from the Plaintiff's speeches. Section 2 of the
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act defines derivative works to mean works resulting from
adaptation, transmission or other transformation of an original work but which constitutes an
independent creation in itself. The exhibits produced in court by the third-party demonstrate that
there was no transformation of the author's original work to constitute an independent creation of
the ringtones. The ringtones played in court constituted solely of the Plaintiff's speech and no
other. He further contended that the transformation, modification or adaptation of the work must
be substantial and bears its authors personality to be original and therefore protected by
copyright. The work must contain sufficient new expressions, and above those embodied in the
Decision of Hon. Mr. Justice Christopher Madrama
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