unreasonableness is met, it is only when the decision is so grossly unreasonable that it may be found to
have met the test of irrationality for the purposes of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
123. The courts will only interfere with the decision of a public authority if it is outside the band of
reasonableness. It was well put by Professor Wade in a passage in his treatise onAdministrative Law,
5th Edition at page 362 and approved by in the case of the Boundary Commission [1983] 2 WLR 458, 475:
“The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important
doctrine that the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to
take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has
genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The court must therefore resist the
temptation to draw the bounds too lightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an
objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which the legislature is
presumed to have intended.”
124. It is paramount at this juncture that this court establishes the ingredients and/or components of natural
justice. The principles of natural justice concern procedural fairness and ensure a fair decision is reached by
an objective decision maker. Maintaining procedural fairness protects the rights of individuals and enhances
public confidence in the process. The ingredients of fairness or natural justice that must guide all
administrative decisions are, firstly, that a person must be allowed an adequate opportunity to present their
case where certain interests and rights may be adversely affected by a decision-maker; secondly, that no
one ought to be a judge in his or her case and this is the requirement that the deciding authority must be
unbiased when according the hearing or making the decision; and thirdly, that an administrative decision
must be based upon logical proof or evidence material.
125. The preliminary hurdle has been surmounted and we have set the legal dimensions in which we shall
determine this application in accordance with the procedural rectitude in the Constitution and the law. We
now proceed to determine the other specific issues raised herein by the parties.
The question of natural justice: un-pleaded issues
126. The question of alleged denial of natural justice is a perfect ground for judicial review and is embodied in the
constitutional provisions especially Articles 25, 47 and 50 of the Constitution. It must, however, be
established by the Ex parte Applicant to the required standard that the Respondent denied it fair trial. The
Ex parte Applicant made two averments in that behalf; the first one is that issues which were not properly
pleaded by the parties formed the basis of the decision of the Respondent. The other aspect was in relation
to the allegation that, those issues were raised in the course of the proceedings and the Ex parte Applicant
was not afforded proper opportunity to respond to them. It is in these two instances that the Ex parte
Applicant reads breach of natural justice, hence denial of right to be heard.
127. Before dealing with the issues raised it is important for the Court to deal with the scope of the request for a
review undertaken by the Respondent under the Act. In our view a review is not an appeal. Under Section
93(1) of the Act provides: