application is by notice of motion, however it is not made ex parte and indeed rule of Order 37
rule 3 provides
―The court shall in all cases, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application be
given to the opposite party.‖
It would appear that this rule is mandatory.
The second possible procedure appears to be under The Copyright Act (Cap 215). Section 13 of
the said Act provides the following remedies for infringement
―S. 13 (2)
(b) an Injunction to restrain further infringement or where no infringement has yet occurred to
restrain any infringement
(c) an Injunction requiring the delivering up to the court and the destruction or other disposal as
court may direct of copies of the works in question; or other articles, which have been, or may
otherwise be, used for the purposes of infringement‖
Section 13 of the Copyright Act therefore provides a direct statutory prohibitory injunction that
is also available to the Applicant. Indeed Section 13 of the Copyright lends itself well to the
remedy of injunction.
The procedure under Section 13 of the Copyright Act is not elaborate enough as no rules have
been made under the section. Under such a situation it would have been possible to combine
section 13 of The Copyright Act and section 39(2) of the Judicature Act to make an application
before court.
I find that in this particular case an application made ex parte for temporary injunction pending
the disposal of the main suit under sections 38 and 39(2) alone is not sufficient to cloth the court
with the legal authority to grant order. Even in the Microsoft Corporation Case (Supra) at 129
which is a Kenyan Case from a Country with fairly similar laws and procedures to Uganda, it
appears the application there was for a prohibitory as opposed to a temporary injunction for
which an interim order was given (see p.130). Injunctions are largely equitable remedies, which
are given at the discretion of the court. In so granting the injunction the courts must have regard