The plaintiff submitted Exhibit P2 in which the PRS (UK) admitted the reciprocal contract
between themselves and the plaintiff was in force at the time the cause of action arose.
According to PW3 the purpose of the reciprocal agreement was to allow proper management of
copyright works by local societies on behalf of the foreign societies that may not personally be
involved in the management in the local area where the protected works are exploited. A
contract of reciprocal representation was admitted in evidence and marked Exhibit P6.
He referred to the case of Performing Rights Society Ltd v Grand Theatres Ltd and another
[1970] 1 EA 576 where it was held that specific assignments were sufficient to convey legal
interest in the performing rights to the plaintiff and the plaintiff was entitled to bring the action
without joining the authors as co-plaintiffs.
Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that article 2 (1) (c) of Exhibit P.6 mandated the plaintiff to
commence and pursue in its name any legal action against any corporate body for illegal
performance of works. He argued that the plaintiff had locus to sue in their own name on the
basis of the reciprocal agreement and the above cited authority.
According to the defendant’s counsel, the plaintiff had no locus standi to bring the suit in its
name. It was argued that the plaintiff was distinguishable from the PRS (UK) and that a suit for
the benefit or on behalf of the PRS (UK) could only be commenced by itself as a competent
party or through its agent.
Counsel for the defendant highlighted the evidence of PW1 where he stated that the plaintiff was
an assignee and at another point said that the plaintiff was only enforcing the rights of the PRS
(UK). His view was that the Deeds of Assignment marked Exhibit P1 (i) – (viii) were made in
favour of the PRS (UK) and not the plaintiff.
Counsel for the defendant cited Order 3 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) for the
position that recognized agents for the purposes of court proceedings are persons holding powers
of attorney authorizing them to make such appearances, and applications and do such acts on
behalf of the parties.
He cited the case of Oboth Marksons Jacob v NRM Misc. Application No. 108 of 2010,
Jeshang Popat Shah v Meera Investments Misc. Application No. 747 of 2002 and Mugoya
Construction and Engineering Ltd v Central Electricals International Limited Misc.
Application No. 699 of 2011 where the provisions of Order 3 rule and 2 of the CPR were
reiterated.
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