“The learned judge erred in finding the facts of Patrick Makumbi Vs. Sole Electric Ltd
relevant.”
Mr. Byenkya made some four destinations between the Makumbi’s case and the decision of this
Court in the appeal by the applicants in this Court. It is accepted that the appeal in Makumbi’s
case was interlocutory and that the hearing of the appeal itself was brief. But that is substantially
what the difference between the two cases. The other differences are artificial. For it is difficult
to interpret the decision of the Court in the present case as conferring title rather than as making
a definitive pronouncement on a point of law. In that sense the decision of the appeal in this case
cannot be on all fours with the decision in Uganda Blanket’s case because in the latter case there
was a definite decision on proprietary interests and those interests were quantified provided a
basis for the taxation of instruction fee. We are therefore of the opinion that there are more
similarities between the decision in Makumbi’s case and the present case than there are between
Blanket Manufacturers case and the present case. Ground (e) must therefore fail.
The last ground (f) states that:“The award of the learned judge was in all the circumstances of the case manifestly
inadequate.”
Mr. Byenkya submitted that the appeal in this case was among the most important appeals last
year and a locus classicus in that it affected an entire Asian Community as owners of most town
estates; that property in the suit is substantial; that the case overturned Lutaya vs. Gandesha
(1986) HCB 46 and that this case justified a higher award of instruction fee.
Mr. Ssekandi countered in effect that the learned judge considered all relevant facts and
principles before he reduced the award of the instruction fee; that it is irrelevant whether other
people are taking advantage of the decision of the Court in this case.
In our view the learned judge considered all the relevant facts to this case and applied the
relevant principles in his ruling. The decision of the appeal in this case is certainly of public
importance but that is only one aspect of the matter to be considered in awarding instruction fee.
In terms of paragraph 9(2) of the third schedule to the rules-