“having considered the arguments of both sides, I would agree that the nature importance and difficulty of the appeal called for special consideration. I would not agree that the amount involved in the appeal could properly take into account the value or present day value. The custodian was adamant that he did hold the property. The owner of the new development was not before the Court. The Prisons Officers who had occupied the part of the building facing Buganda Road were not before the Court. Of course, the nature of the property of the Tustees was connected to the fundamental issue concerning expropriation but it was not a question of transferring title as yet. It was the intellectual argument whether the property which the Trustees lost in 1972 could be covered by the Act of 1982 that was paramount. The Supreme Court decided that that leasehold property could be covered by the Act of 1982. The Court in truth had no power to go further, without deciding matters concerning persons or institutions not before the Court. It is clear that the “amount involved” was not the actual value of the combined plots as they are today. It is also clear that the conceptualizing the amount involved, and one must sympathise that the arguments in this Court have been perhaps rather broader than were presented to him. Nevertheless, I have reached the conclusion that the instructions fee was manifestly excessive as proceeding upon the wrong principle of ascertaining the actual value of the property today.” We think with respect that on the facts of the case the learned judge was right. He was actually summarizing the results of the appeal which the learned taxing officer had misunderstood. Mr. Byenkya, stated that the appeal was of great public importance. We accept that the appeal was of some public importance. However its importance is limited to one point of law namely the interpretation of S. 1(1) (C) with regard to the suit land. Further we think that the appeal was not too complex nor did it present more than normal difficulty nor indeed did it involve exceptional responsibility which in effect is what Mr. Byenkya sought to place on it before us so as to attract a high fee. With regard to placing monetary value to the subject matter of litigation, Mr. Ssekandi contended in effect that since in the suit, value was not the subject matter of litigation, value could not be used for taxation purpose. He supported the reasoning of the learned judge, a portion of which