The suit was dismissed. Upon appeal to this court the principal ground of appeal which the court upheld was that the learned trial judge erred in law in finding that the expropriated properties Act, 1982 did not apply to the suit land. In his judgment in Civil Appeal No. 21/93 (Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute vs. D.A.P. Custodian Board). Wambuzi C.J., concluded his judgment in the following words:“in my judgment the suit property in the case before us comes within the provisions of section 1(1) (c) of the Expropriated Properties Act 1982 and it follows that section 1(2) (b) of the Act applies to continue in force the expired lease until the property is dealt with under the Act I would therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and Decree of the High Court and substitute therefore a declaration that the Expropriated Properties Act, 1982 applied to the suit land. It was not shown that the respondent has the power or legal capacity to grant a repossession certificate. Accordingly I would decline to give a declaration regarding entitlement to a re-possession certificate which may be against the interest of persons or authorities who are not a party to these proceedings.” In his concurring judgment Platt J.S.C at page 15 of his judgment stated that:“Turning then to the declarations sought; I would grant the first declaration that section 1(1) (c) applied to the property. I would not wish to fetter the Minister’s declaration whether or not to order possession in case other consideration still apply. I would therefore allow the appeal, I would set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court, and substitute therefore judgment for the Plaintiff for the first declaration sought. I would leave open the second declaration.” From the foregoing we think respect that Platt. J.S.C., was partly correct in his ruling when he held that the issue before the Court during the hearing of the substantive appeal was intellectual. We think that he did not err in principle when he held that the value of the suit property was not a proper basis for taxation of costs. He had considered all aspects of the reference before him and stated in his ruling that:-