“(a) The learned judge erred in principle in finding that the value of the property known as plot 1 Bombo Road and 38 Buganda Road was not a proper basis for the taxation of costs.” (b) The learned judge erred by failing to take into account that there were substantial developments carried out by the Registered Trustees of Kampala Institute in the property and thus failing to distinguish between developments done after the Military take over of the suit property.” Mr. Byenkya submitted that the learned judge mixed up principles in his review of the taxation and assumed the duty to decide the criteria upon which taxation should be based. He cited Attorney General vs. Uganda Blankets Manufacturers Ltd. (Supra) to support his criticism of the ruling. Counsel contended, and we here agree with the statement that once principles are correctly followed there should be no interference by appellate Court in the taxation by the taxing officer: Patrick Makumbi & Another vs. Sole Electric Ltd (Supra). Mr. Byenkya regurgitated the arguments he had made before the taxing officers and his written submissions before Platt, J.S.C., on the taxation reference Counsel contended in effect that the judge should not have reduced the fee. Counsel criticized the judge for holding that the suit did not deal with property, since both the plaint and the written statement of Defence referred to the suit property. He contended that under Rule 31 of the Rules of the Court, an award of Court is not to be taken into account during taxation; Rather it is the subject of litigation which should be taken into account. He illustrated this by a hypothetical case to the effect that setting aside by an appeal Court of an award of 1 million given by a trial Court cannot be expressed in monetary terms. In such a case it is the subject of litigation which counts. On this point we think that each case is decided on its own facts and one cannot be too hypothetical in matters which are decided on evidence. Finally learned counsel submitted in effect that when this court allowed the substantive appeal and declared that section 1(1) (c) of the Expropriate Properties Act, 1982 applied to the suit land, that declaration conferred proprietary rights to the applicants. In his view, therefore, Platt, J.S.C., erred to hold that title was not the subject of litigation.